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Sorting Through The Establishment Clause
Tests, Looking Past the Lemon
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel
Village School District v. Grumet'
I. INTRODUCTION
After the decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 one three-pronged test
controlled all Establishment Clause issues.3 The Lemon test has guided the
court's analysis of a broad range of issues, including governmental speech on
religious topics, governmental impositions of burdens and grants of benefits,
and governmental delegations of civil power to religious bodies.4
The Lemon test was not originally intended to provide strict rules, but
rather, "helpful signposts."5 However, the Court began using the Lemon test
exclusivelyto evaluate Establishment Clause issues soon after the decision was
rendered.'
The results of some of these decisions indicate the test should not always
control the outcome. Of particular relevance in the background of the Kiryas
Joel dispute was Aguilar v. Felton.6 The Aguilar Court declared that public
funds could not constitutionally be used to pay public school teachers when
they furnished special educational services at parochial schools.7 The Aguilar
decision sparked the plaintiffs in Kiryas Joel to question the constitutionality
of Kiryas Joel's own similar program. In Kiryas Joel, five Justices thought
the Aguilar decision may have been incorrect. If it had not been for the
1. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
2. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Court's decision in Lemon set forth the
following test: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion
... finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion." Id. (citations omitted).
3. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I. See
also, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that the Establishment
Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
4. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
5. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 740-41 (1973).
6. 473 U.S 402 (1985).
7. Id. at 413-14.
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Aguilar decision, the New York legislature would not have created a separate
school district for the village of Kiryas Joel, and this litigation would not have
been prompted. The result in Aguilar and its impact on Kiryas Joel exemplify
the harsh result obtained through rigid application of existing standards.8
The Justices have not been altogether satisfied with Lemon's unitary
approach to Establishment Clause issues. One demonstration of this is the
Court's retreat, in dicta, from the Aguilar decision.9 Before Kiryas Joel was
heard by this Court, several Justices had introduced alternatives to Lemon.
The Court has, on several occasions invoked these tests rather than using
Lemon, but it has not yet announced how these tests fit into Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. However, Justice O'Connor suggested the other tests
are necessary because no single test can effectively dispose of the multitude
of possible Establishment Clause issues.
Commentators regarded Kiryas Joel as a possible vehicle for elucidating
the Establishment Clause tests." However, because the Justices did not agree
which standard was appropriate, their separate analyses provided many
examples of the various standards, rather than a reformulation or clarification
of the appropriate standard for the issue presented in Kiryas Joel.
8. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9. Id.
10. By accepting the invitation to review Grumet, "[t]he Supreme Court agreed
• . . to re-examine the strict limits that the court established 22 years ago on
governmental support for religious groups." Aaron Epstein, Justices to Review
Religion Standard, A Public School District was Created for Disabled Children of
Hasidic Jews. The Separation of Church and State is at Issue, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Nov. 30, 1993, at A01. Professor Michael McConnell stated "[t]he case
would be 'an excellent vehicle' for a reassessment of the Lemon test." James H.
Andrews, Court, Lawmakers Wrestle with Church-State Issues, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Dec. 9, 1993, at p.2.
Some commentators did not believe revision would signal positive change. "We
are very worried that the court could rewrite years of doctrine and open the door to
massive government aid to religious education." Tony Mauro, Jewish School Tests
Church-State Separation, Court's Newest Member Could Cast the Crucial Vote, USA
TODAY, Nov. 30, 1993 at 08A (quoting Joseph Conn of Americans United for the
Separation of Church and State).
Others simply did not foresee a revision of the Lemon test in Kiryas Joel. Jesse
Choper, a professor at University of California-Berkeley, "said it was 'very unlikely'
the court will make a drastic change in Establishment Clause law this termL]" quoted
by David G. Savage, Justices to Hear a Church-State Case on Schools, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1993, at p. 1 pt. A, col. 4.
[Vol. 60
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Kiryas Joel Village is located in Monroe, Orange County, New York,
and is populated exclusively by Satmars, practitioners of a form of orthodoxed
Judaism called Hasidism." The Satmars avoid assimilation into the
dominant American culture.' They do not watch television, listen to the
radio, or read English-language publications. 3 Yiddish is the primary
language spoken in the community. 4 The Satmars abide by a strict dress
code; Women shave their heads and cover their scalp with a wig and a hat and
men wear long black coats, side curls, and head coverings.'
The sect originates from a town near the Hungarian-Romanian border. 6
Those who survived the Holocaust followed their leader, Grand Rebbe Joel
Teitelbaum to the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, New York. 7 Later,
overpopulation in Brooklyn spurred the group's decision to move to an
undeveloped subdivision in the Monroe School District.' After their new
neighbors complained that the Satmar custom of multi-generation housing
violated the city's single-family zoning, the Satmars successfully petitioned to
form their own village.'9 The Village of Kiryas Joel, named after their
leader, currently has a population of approximately 8,500 and consists of 320
acres.
20
Although the Village of Kiryas Joel is located in the Monroe-Woodbury
School District, the children are educated at parochial schools in the village.
Boys learn to interpret the Torah at the United Talmudic Academy, while girls
are trained at Bias Rochel to assume their future role as wife and mother.2
The problem leading to this dispute arose because the Satmars claimed
they did not have the financial resources to provide special educational to their
disabled children. 2 Under both state and federal law, all children have the





16. Id. See generally ISRAEL RUBIN, SATMAR: AN ISLAND IN THE CrrY (1972)
and LIs HARRIS, HOLY DAYS: THE WORLD OF A HASIDIC FAMILY (1985).
17. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
18. Id. at 2485.
19. See, In Re Formation of a New Village to be Known as "Kiryas Joel",
MONROE TowN SUPERVISOR, Dec. 10, 1976; See generallyN.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 200,
et seq. (McKinney 1973 and Supp. 1995).
20. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
21. Id.
22. Board of Educ. of the Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Wieder, 527
1995]
3
Russell: Russell: Sorting through the Establishment Clause
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
right to receive public education.' The Monroe-Woodbury School District
attempted to provide the necessary service to the disabled Satmar children.
In 1984, the school district agreed to furnish "health and welfare services" at
a "neutral site," an annex to one of the Village's parochial schools.24 One
year later, in response to the Supreme Court decision in Aguilar, declaring
unconstitutional the use of public funding to pay public school teachers
instructing children at parochial schools, the Monroe-Woodbury School
District discontinued its services.25
Left with no alternative but to forego special education, some parents
chose to send their children to the Monroe-Woodbury public schools.26 They
soon withdrew the children, however, because they suffered "panic, fear and
trauma [as a result of] leaving their own community and being with people
whose ways were so different [than theirs]."'27
Parents next sought administrative review of the Monroe-Woodbury
School District's decision to discontinue providing educational services at the
parochial school site.28 The School Board responded by seeking a
declaration that it lacked statutory authority to provide services to the disabled
students at an annex to a parochial school.29 The court rejected the School
Board's argument, holding that state education laws did not restrict the Board
to offering its services "only in the regular classes and programs of its public
schools."3" However, the decision did not result in a victory for the Satmars,
because the court also concluded the Satmars were not entitled to receive
special education at a neutral site within the village.3 The court's holding
left to the Monroe-Woodbury School District the decision whether to offer
educational services outside the regular public school site. 2 The school
district opted to continue not doing so.
The Satmars next presented their dilemma to the legislature, which,
seeking to resolve the prolonged dispute, enacted Chapter 748. Chapter 748
of the Laws of 1989 created a school district, coterminous with the boundaries
N.E.2d 767, 770 (N.Y. 1988).
23. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
(1988 ed. and Supp. IV); N.Y. CONST., Art. 11, §1 (McKinney 1987).
24. Wieder, 527 N.E.2d at 770 (citing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1988)).
25. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485 (citing Aguilar v. Fenton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985)).
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing Wieder, 527 N.E.2d 767, 770 (N.Y. 1988)).
28. Wieder, 527 N.E.2d at 770.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 775 (citing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602-c (McKinney 1995)).
31. Id. at 770 (citing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602-c (McKinney 1995)).
32. Id. at 775.
[Vol. 60
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of the Kiryas Joel Village, located wholly within the Monroe-Woodbury
School District.
33
By its terms, Chapter 748 provided for a full school district, but the
school board operated only a special education program for disabled
children.34 The other Satmar children continued to be educated at Kiryas
Joel's parochial schools. However, all the children relied on the new school
district for "transportation, remedial education, and health and welfare
services."
35
The executive director and the president of the New York State School
Boards Association, Louis Grumet and Albert Hawk,36 brought suit claiming
Chapter 7483' delegated governmental powers to a religious organization in
violation of the Establishment, Clause. The Boards of Education of the
33. Chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989, entitled "An Act to establish a separate
school district in and for the Village of Kiryas Joel, Orange County," provided in
relevant part:
The territory of the Village of Kiryas Joel in the Town of Monroe, Orange
county, on the date when this act shall take effect, shall be and hereby is
constituted a separate school district, and shall be known as the Kiryas Joel
Village school district and shall have and enjoy all of the powers and duties
of union free school district under the provisions of the education law.
1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 748.
34. Kiryas Joel's public special education program was operated by a
superintendent with 20 years of experience with the New York public schools and by
non-Hasidic teachers who lived outside the village. The program was governed by
New York laws applicable to all public schools, so it observed national holidays but
remained in session during Hasidic religious holidays. Furthermore, unlike the
village's religious schools, the public schools were purely secular in design; no
religious symbols adorned their walls. Students of both sexes were educated together,
although the tenets of Hasidim prohibit co-education. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2506
(Scalia, J., dissenting). However, the school district's board of education was
composed entirely of Satmars "elected by the qualified voters of the village of Kiryas
Joel." N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 3202 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1994). Because the village
is exclusively populated by the Satmars, the school district's governing power was
delegated entirely to the Satmars.
35. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2486.
36. Louis Grumet and Albert Hawk originally brought suit as individuals and in
their capacities as executive director and president of the New York State School
Board Association, respectively. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
ruled that they could not sue as board members because the Association itself was not
a tax-paying citizen within the meaning of New York law and it therefore did not have
the substantive right to raise constitutional challenges to a state statute. Grumet v.
Board of Education, 592 N.Y.S.2d 123, 125 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). Grumet and
Hawk continued the suit as plaintiffs in their capacity as individual citizens.
37. See supra note 32.
1995]
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Kiryas Joel School District and the Monroe-Woodbury School District
intervened as defendants.
The trial court held that Chapter 748 violated all three prongs of the
Lemon test and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.38 A divided
appellate division upheld that decision." The Court of Appeals of New York
affirmed," relying primarily on the second prong of the Lemon test. The
court reasoned that the school district was not created to fill a void where no
opportunity to receive special education existed, but rather to replace an
educational system that the children's parents believed was inadequate.4
Therefore, Chapter 748 constituted a governmental endorsement of the sect's
religious tenets.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. The Court held
that an act is unconstitutional if neither its terms nor the conditions
surrounding its enactment provides assurance that it has been and will continue
to be implemented on a neutral basis with respect to similarly situated
organizations.42
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause comprise the First
Amendment Religion Clauses. Although they are intended to complement one
another, tension frequently arises in their application. In its strictest form, the
Establishment Clause mandates a "wall of separation" between church and
state43; no church or religious group may receive any form of governmental
38. Grumet v. New York State Educ. Dept., 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1992).
39. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d
123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
40. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618 N.E.2d 94,
98 (N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
41. Id. at 99.
Because special services are already available to the handicapped children
of Kiryas Joel, the primary effect of chapter 748 is not to provide those
services, but to yield to the demands of a religious community whose
separatist tenants create a tension between the needs of its handicapped
children and the need to adhere to certain religious practices . . . the
primary effect of such an extensive effort to accommodate the desire to
insulate the Satmarer Hasidic students inescapably conveys a message of
governmental endorsement of religion. Thus 'a core purpose of the
Establishment Clause' is violated.
Id. (citing School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 389).
42. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2491.
43. 16 THE WRITNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281, 281-82 (A. Lipscomb ed.
[Vol. 60
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aid. However, the Free Exercise Clause requires government to
"accommodate" the needs of a particular group or individual to protect the
right to practice their religion." One example of the tensions between the
two clauses occurs when government must confer benefits on religious people
or organizations in the same way that the benefit is conferred on society
generally." Conferring the benefit might be seen as impermissible
governmental support of religion, but withholding it might be an equally
unconstitutional act of governmental hostility towards religion. Because of the
tension between separationism and accommodation, the Establishment Clause's
strict "wall" metaphor has been rejected. Instead government aid has to be
provided to individuals or groups similarly situated to those for whom the aid
was intended, irrespective of religion (or irreligion)."
In search of a uniform standard with which to analyze Establishment
Clause issues, the Supreme Court adopted the Lemon test.47 The first two
prongs of Lemon were taken from Abington School District v. Schempp.
Reasoning that the purpose of the questioned government action must be
secular and the primary effect of the action must not advance or inhibit
religion, the Court in Schempp found that the common practice of teacher-led
prayer in public schools was unconstitutional.49 The third and final prong
of Lemon was articulated first in Walz v. Tax Commission," a case which
upheld exempting real property dedicated to religious use from municipal
taxation. The Court reasoned, inter alia, that the exemption did not result in
impermissible assistance to religious groups, but instead "restrict[ed] the fiscal
relationship between church and state and . . . complement[ed] and
reinforce[d] the desired separation insulating each from the other."'"
To pass constitutional scrutiny under Lemon, a legislative act must satisfy
all three prongs. Thus, if a court decides the purpose of the government
1903) (referring to a letter Thomas Jefferson wrote to a Committee of the Danbury
Baptist Association dated January 1, 1820).
44. Sherbert v. Verner, 372 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
45. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Meriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.
Ct. 2141, 2147 (1993) (holding that a public school must allow a religious group to
have access to their auditorium to show religious films, if the district would allow non-
religious groups access to the auditorium for non-religious purposes); Zobrest, 113 S.
Ct.-at 2469 (holding that the state did not violate the Establishment Clause by paying
for a hearing interpreter to aid a hearing-impaired student in a parochial school, since
that benefit was offered to students at public schools as well).
46. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct at 2148; Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469.
47. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971).
48. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
49. Id. at 222-26.
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action is not secular, if its primary effect advances or inhibits religion, or if
it results in excessive entanglement of government and religion, the act will
be declared unconstitutional. Although cases handed down soon after Lemon
was decided stated the test was meant only as a guideline,52 Lemon has more
often been applied as a rule.
The Court has become increasingly dissatisfied with Lemon. Several
Supreme Court Justices have suggested revising or replacing Lemon, 3 and
the Court has even used some alternatives. For example, the Court mentioned
Lemon in Larson v. Valente, but decided the case based on a "strict scrutiny"
test introduced by Justice Brennan.54 Larson's result was that an exemption
from a charitable solicitation regulation was unconstitutional when applied
only to religious organizations receiving at least half their funding from
members or affiliated organizations. 5
52. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971) (decided the
same day as Lemon); Hunt, 413 U.S. at 734; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359
(1975) (citing Tilton, 403 U.S. at 677-78).
53. Justices White, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas have all suggested
that Lemon need to be revised or replaced. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
91 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) ("I would support a basic reconsideration of our
precedents."); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring) ("I am no more reconciled now to Lemon than I was when it was
decided"); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Lemon "has no basis
in the history of the amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields
unprincipled results . . . "); Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 422 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I
question the utility of entanglement as a separate Establishment Clause standard in
most cases"); Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Like some
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence"). Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 640 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Abandoning Lemon's purpose test-a test
which exacerbates the tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses,
has no basis in the language or history of the Amendment, and, as today's decision
shows, has wonderfully flexible consequences-would be a good place to start"); Lee,
112 S. Ct. at 2678 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing
Lemon as "not deriv[ing] from, but positively conflict[ing] with, our long-accepted
constitutional traditions."); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655-56 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I ... do not wish to be seen as advocating,
let alone adopting, [Lemon] as our primary guide in this difficult area... [s]ubstantial
revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order . ..
54. 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
55. Id. at 246 and 249-50 ("When we are presented with a state law granting a
denominational preference, our precedents demand we treat the law as suspect and that
we apply strict scrutiny in adjudicating its constitutionality").
[Vol. 60
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Decided two years later, Lynch v. Donnelly56 is noteworthy for two
reasons. First, it demonstrated that judges applying the Lemon test could
reach inconsistent results, even when considering identical facts. The majority
and dissenting opinions both applied Lemon, but the majority held that a city's
sponsorship of a publicly displayed nativity scene was constitutional while the
dissent concluded it was not. The second reason Lynch is important is that in
her concurrence, Justice O'Connor introduced the "no-endorsement" test,"
stating that the inquiry is not whether secular objectives for the legislation
existed, but rather "whether the government intend[ed] to convey a message
of endorsement or disapproval of religion" or whether that message had such
effect.5 8
Concurring again in Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice O'Connor stated that the
no-endorsement test should be considered from the perspective of an
"objective observer." 9  The dispositive question is whether an objective
observer would "perceive" the questioned governmental action to "send[] a
message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community .... ,60
The no-endorsement test has been accepted by a majority of the Court in
some cases. In 1989, a five-Justice majority used a version of the no-endorse-
ment test in County of Allegheny v. ACLU to determine the constitutionality
of public sponsorship of religious symbols (a Christmas tree, a Chanukah
menorah, and a Nativity scene).6' However, not all Justices believe this test
is viable. Justice Kennedy, for one, opposed the no-endorsement test pointing
out that very few government attempts to accommodate religion could survive
a strict application of the test.62 He commented that a "reasonable" atheist
could feel like an "outsider" to the political community as a result of the
references to God in the Pledge of Allegiance, in legislative prayers, and the
motto printed on U.S. currency. 3
56. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
57. Id. at 670-72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58. Id.
59. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 69 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 476 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring)).
61. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578 (1989).
62. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 671-72. It has also been suggested that while the endorsement test is
appropriate when government attempts to benefit a religious group or religion,
generally (i.e., cases concerning official prayers and publicly sponsored religious
displays), it is inappropriate to judge the government's attempts to alleviate burdens.
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and The Powers of Government, 41 UCLA
L. REv. 1297, 1309-1310 (1994). Supporting this contention is that Justice O'Connor
1995]
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Justice Kennedy suggested, instead, replacing Lemon with a "coercion"
test. He applied this test in his concurrence in County of Allegheny 4 as well
as his majority opinion in Lee v. Weisman. In Lee, he noted that "prayer
exercises in public schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion."66
Justice Kennedy defined coercion broadly to include social and psychological
pressure.67 However, the coercion test also has critics. 
6
Justice Rehnquist authored his test, "nonpreferential treatment," in his
dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree.69  According to Justice Rehnquist, the
Establishment Clause "[forbids] establishment of a national religion, and
[forbids] preference among religious sects or denominations," but does not
forbid "programs that benefit religion, generally, without preferring one
religion to another, or religion to non-religion."7"
did not even mention the no-endorsement test in either Aguilar or in School Dist. of
Grand Rapids, both Establishment Clause challenges to school funding, even though
she had introduced the test only one year earlier. Id. For scholarly criticism of the
no-endorsement test, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the 'No Endorsement'Test, 86 MICH. L. REV.
266 (1987); Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701,
711-712 (1986); Craig L. Olivo, Note, Grumet v. Board of Education of the Kiryas
Joel Village School District. When Neutrality Masks Hostility-The Exclusion of
Religious Communities From an Entitlement to Public Schools, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 775, 814 (1993).
64. 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657 (1992).
66. Id. at 2658 (citing Engle, 370 U.S. at 421 and Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S.
at 307).
67. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
68. The coercion test has been criticized by Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor and Souter. See, e.g., County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 628 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (Justice O'Connor suggested that the coercion test "would
make the Free Exercise Clause a redundancy"); Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2664 ("The court
has repeatedly recognized that a violation of the Establishment Clause is not predicated
on coercion"). For scholarly criticism, see Ronald C. Kahn, God Save Us from the
Coercion Test: Constitutive Decisionmaking, Polity Principles, and Religious
Freedom, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 983 (1993).
69. 472 U.S. at 92-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 105. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT at xii, 155 (1986) (suggesting that Justice Rehnquist
"flunked history when he wrote" his dissent in Wallace); Douglas Laycock, "Non-
preferential"Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 875, 885-94 (1986).
(Vol. 60
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Even Supreme Court Justices who have not introduced alternative tests
have opposed strict adherence to the Lemon test.7 The author of the Lemon
test, retired Chief Justice Burger, noted "we have repeatedly emphasized our
unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive
area."
72
That so many Justices have expressed dissatisfaction with Lemon indicates
that the test is not well-suited to analyze all Establishment Clause issues.
However, the Court has not yet agreed upon one sufficiently satisfying
standard with which to overrule Lemon.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In a 6 to 3 decision, the Court ruled that Chapter 748 was
unconstitutional. Justice Souter wrote for the Court. The first section of his
opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Ginsburg, constituted a
plurality. The second section was accepted by a majority of the Court,
consisting of all the members of the plurality plus Justice O'Connor. Justice
O'Connor wrote a separate opinion, concurring with the judgment, but not
with the plurality. Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion, as did
Justice Stevens, whose opinion was joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice
Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy concurred only in the judgment. Justice Scalia
dissented, accompanied by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.
A. Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter declared Chapter 748
unconstitutional because it did not provide an "effective means of
guaranteeing" that governmental power has been and will continue to be
neutrally employed.73 The case-specific manner in which Chapter 748 was
71. Justices Scalia, Thomas and White have opposed strict adherence to the
Lemon text. See, e.g, Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149-50 (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., concurring); Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2678 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 400 (White, J., dissenting); Wallace, 472
U.S. at 90-91 (White, J., dissenting); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 282 (White, J., dissenting);
New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 134 (1977) (White, J., dissenting);
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring);
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting).
72. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
73. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2491 (citing Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116,
125 (1982)). The Grendel's Den court invalidated a Massachusetts law that gave
religious groups veto power over applications for liquor licenses in their vicinity for
1995]
11
Russell: Russell: Sorting through the Establishment Clause
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
enacted left the Court "without any direct way to review such state action,"
because "a legislature's failure to enact a special law is itself unreviewable."74
If the village of Kiryas Joel had received its authority through general
legislation, "simply as one of many communities eligible for equal treatment
under the law," or alternatively, as a result of a series of special acts written
to benefit various communities, the likelihood of its constitutionality would
have been greater.75 For instance, an act written broadly to apply to any
group that meets certain criteria would describe the standards a group would
have to meet to receive the benefit of the act. On the other hand, a "series of
special acts" would provide examples of the kinds of organizations that were
eligible.76
In addition to being "special" because it was enacted for the sole benefit
of a single group, Chapter 748 was also unique in that it was against New
York's trend of consolidating school districts to form schools "large enough
to provide a comprehensive education at affordable cost."77 The Kiryas Joel
Village School District has only 13 local, full-time students, and less than 200
total students, including part-time and out-of-area students.78 To demonstrate
the uniqueness of Chapter 748, Souter contrasted earlier attempts at similar
arrangements: "[e]arly on in the development of public education in New
York, the State rejected highly localized school districts for New York City
when they were promoted as a way to allow separate schooling for Roman
Catholic children. 79
Lastly, Justice Souter found that the barriers to providing educational
services to the Satmar's disabled children arose not from religious tenets but
from preference. Although "Satmars prefer to live together 'to facilitate
individual religious observance and maintain social, cultural and religious
values'.., it is not 'against their religion' to interact with others."8 Chapter
748, then, was unacceptable because it merely catered to the Satmars'
two reasons: (1) absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that governmental
power has been and will continue to be neutrally employed; (2) impermissible
entanglement of government and religion. Grendel'sDen, 459 U.S. at 125-26. Justice
Souter's majority in Kiryas Joel used the first Grendel'sDen criterion to strike Chapter
748. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2491. The plurality, discussed infra notes 86-96 and
accompanying text, used both criteria. Id. at 2488-89.
74. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. 2491.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2489.
78. Id. at 2490.
79. Id. at 2491 (citing R. CHURCH & M. SEDLAK, EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 162, 167-69 (1976)).
80. Id. at 2492 n.9 (citing Brief for Petitioner No. 93-517, p.4, n.1).
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"religiously grounded preferences" rather than accommodating that which their
religion mandates."' According to Justice Souter, an act that bends to the
preferences of a particular religious group clearly violates the principle that
neutrality among religions must be honored."2 The enactment of Chapter 748
could not even be justified by principles of accommodation, as Justice Scalia's
dissent would have liked, because the Court has "never hinted that an
otherwise unconstitutional delegation of political power to a religious group
could be saved as a religious accommodation."83  Thus, Justice Souter's
majority found Chapter 748 an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
He suggested alternative ways, however, to provide special education to
the disabled Satmar children. Because separation is not mandated by their
religion, the children could receive bilingual and bicultural education within
the Monroe-Woodbury district.84 Alternatively, the Monroe-Woodbury
School District could provide special education services at a neutral site in the
village.85  Furthermore, Justice Souter suggested that the Satmars take
advantage of the administrative review process they instigated but had not
exhausted before Chapter 748 was enacted.86 Lastly, the legislature "could
certainly enact general legislation tightening the mandate to school districts on
matters of special education or bilingual and bicultural offerings.1
87
B. Plurality Opinion
Although a majority of the Court agreed that Chapter 748 violated the
rule in Grendel's Den because it provided no effective means to guarantee that
legislative power would be neutrally employed,88 the plurality went a step
further. They applied the second principle of Grendel's Den, that
governmental power should not be delegated to people or organizations based
on a religious criteria,89 and concluded that Chapter 748 could not be
validated because it did not delegate power "on principles neutral to religion,
to individuals whose religious identities are incidental to their receipt of civic
authority."9
81. Id. at 2492.
82. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982).
83. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2493. "[T]he Constitution allows the state to
accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens." Id. at 2492.
84. Id. at 2493.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2493.
88. Id. at 2491.
89. Id. at 2488.
90. Id. at 2489. See also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27
13
Russell: Russell: Sorting through the stablishment Clause
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
The plurality conceded that Chapter 748 did not delegate governmental
power to individuals explicitly in their religious capacity or to the village
explicitly as a religious organization. The plurality found this was enough to
distinguish Kiryas Joel from Grendel's Den facially but not substantively.
Delegating power to the "qualified voters of the village of Kiryas Joel"'" and
to the "territory of the village of Kiryas Joel"92 was unconstitutional, just as
the statute empowering churches in Grendel's Den. In both cases,
governmental power was delegated to a group based on its religious affiliation.
The plurality supported its conclusion that governmental power was
delegated based on religious criteria with two findings: (1) the school district
was created "under the terms of an unusual and special legislative act,"'93 and
(2) the district's boundary purposefully followed village lines so as to include
only Satmars.94 In addition, the Satmars and the legislature had agreed that
20 disabled Hasidic children living outside Kiryas Joel would come to the
village daily to receive special education,95 and that if a non-Hasidic child
were to move into the village, the district would pay his or her tuition at a
neighboring school.96 Based on these findings, the plurality would also
invalidate Chapter 748 because the Act created a "political subdivision" which
defined the "qualifications for its franchise by a religious test."97
C. Concurring Opinions
1. Justice Blackmun
In a short concurrence, Justice Blackmun wrote only to reaffirm his
commitment to the Lemon test. Although the Court's opinion did not rely on
the three-pronged test, Justice Blackmun asserted that the Kiryas Joel decision
did not depart from Lemon's principles. Instead, he believed the decision was
based on Lemon through Grendel's Den.
(1982) (quoting Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at 222) (An act which results in "fusion
of governmental and religious functions" by delegating important, discretionary
governmental powers to religious bodies impermissibly entangles government and
religion.)
91. 1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 748.
92. Id.
93. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2489. The plurality found that "the district's
creation ran uniquely counter to state practice ... [and that] customary and neutral
principles would not have dictated the same result." Id. at 2490.
94. Id. at 2489.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2490 (citing Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982).
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Justice Blackmun claimed that the two tests set forth in Grendel's Den,
and used by the Court in Kiryas Joel, were essentially the second and third
prong of Lemon. Disallowing "a fusion of government and religious
functions," he said was the same as Lemon's "entanglement" prong.9 8 The
need for an "effective means of guaranteeing" that governmental power is
neutrally employed" was, according to Justice Blackmun, the same as Lemon's
"effect" prong.99 Justice Blackmun was the only Justice on the Kiryas Joel
Court to defend the Lemon test, and he has since retired from the Court.
2. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens wrote simply to add to the reasons for invalidating
Chapter 748. He stated that the establishment of a new school district within
the village would "tend to support the religious sect's interest in segregating
itself,"'00 a result he believed was contrary to the public's interest in
"promoting diversity and understanding in the public schools."' 0 ' Instead
of "responding with a solution that affirmatively supports a religious sect's
interest in ... preventing its children from associating with their neighbors,"
Justice Stevens suggested the legislature should have "taken steps to alleviate
the children's fear by teaching their schoolmates to be tolerant and respectful
of Satmar customs."'0 2  Responding to the problem in that manner, he
concluded, would raise no constitutional concerns. 3
3. Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor did not join the majority opinion because she
considered the test set forth in Larson,l°4 not Grendel's Den, most
relevant. 5 The Larson Court stated that the principles of the Lemon test
were irrelevant to the issue being considered because Lemon should be used
to measure laws affording uniform benefit to all religions, not provisions that
discriminate among religions."0 6 In Larson, rather than applying Lemon,
Justice Brennan's majority used a "strict scrutiny" test: "When we are
presented with a state law granting denominational preference, our precedents
98. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2495 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
99. Id.




104. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
105. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2495-2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982).
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demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in
judging its constitutionality."' 7  Although she used different precedent,
Justice O'Connor's result paralleled Justice Souter's. Using Larson's strict
scrutiny test, Justice O'Connor would have invalidated Chapter 748 because
the language of the Act proved it was written solely for the benefit of the
Village ofKiryas Joel."°8 Justice O'Connor also observed that "this benefit
was given to this group based on its religion," thus presenting an even more
obvious appearance of impermissible establishment."°
Justice O'Connor did not believe invalidating the act would prevent the
disabled Satmar children from receiving the education to which they are
entitled."10 She explained that New York could allow all villages to
establish their own school districts, or set forth neutral criteria and allow any
village that could meet those criteria to form a new school district.",
However, she also suggested returning to the old arrangement, under which
the Monroe-Woodbury School District provided educational services to
disabled Satmar students at a neutral site in the village, which was
discontinued in response to the Aguilar decision." 2 Justice O'Connor, who
dissented in Aguilar, restated her belief that the case was incorrectly decided
and asserted that the decision should be reconsidered.,"
Remarking on the Court's refusal to use Lemon in this case and in other
recent cases,"4 she noted "the slide away from Lemon's unitary approach is
well under way [and] a return . . . would likely be futile.""' Justice
O'Connor advised that no single test could control all Establishment Clause
issues because "[t]he same constitutional principle may operate very
differently in different contexts.""' 6 Instead, Lemon should be replaced with
a less unitary approach, in order to provide more precise analyses of specific
issues within Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
107. Id. at 246.






114. Id. at 2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothill Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993); Larson, 456 U.S. 228
(1982)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2499.
[Vol. 60
16




Justice Kennedy, concurring only in the judgment, believed Chapter 748
was unconstitutional because the district was created "by drawing political
boundaries on the basis of religion,"" 7 and not because, as the majority
held, the act had no internal safeguards to ensure its consistent application in
the future. Political-line drawing based on religious criteria is impermissible,
and, according to Justice Kennedy, "there is more than a fine line ... between
the voluntary association that leads to a political community comprised of
people who share a common religious faith, and the forced separation that
occurs when the government draws explicit political boundaries on the basis
of peoples' faith.""1 8 Justice Kennedy found this principle was violated
because the New York legislature enacted Chapter 748 with purpose and
precision to create school district boundaries contiguous with the village
lines." 9
However, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the majority that the Act was
unconstitutional because no internal mechanisms existed that would ensure the
legislature has and will continue to implement it consistently. 20 Remarking
that the Court has no reason to believe the New York Legislature would not
grant the same accommodation in a similar future case, Justice Kennedy stated
"[t]his reasoning reverses the usual presumption that a statute is constitutional
and, in essence, adjudges the New York Legislature guilty until it proves itself
innocent."'' Justice Kennedy said there was no basis for a presumption of
guilt, since there was no evidence that the legislature has so far denied a
similarly situated village the same opportunity.'22
Justice Kennedy also disagreed with Justice Souter that Chapter 748
crossed the boundaries of accommodation into impermissible establish-
ment."u Principles of accommodation allow the Court to lift restrictive
burdens, and Justice Kennedy found that in this case lifting those burdens
clearly outweighed any reciprocal burdens placed on non-Satmars.2 Chapter
748 alleviated a burden by affording the disabled Satmar children the
opportunity to receive special education without enduring the "understandable
anxiety and distress" that resulted from attending the public school. 2 ' The
117. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 2504 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
120. Id. at 2502 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 2503 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2501-02 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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fact the burden was not created by religious tenants prohibiting children from
receiving a public education, but rather by the Satmars' desire not to
assimilate, did not render it unremediable.'26 Had political line-drawing not
been based on religious criteria, Justice Kennedy believed Chapter 748 would
have been constitutional because Supreme Court precedent allows the Court
to accommodate religion by alleviating burdens.
Lastly, like Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy noted the decision in
Aguilar "may have been erroneous ...[o]ne misjudgment is no excuse,
however, for.., bending rules to free the Satmars from a predicament into
which we put them."'27
D. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia's biting dissent contended that Chapter 748 was
constitutional because governmental power was delegated based on cultural,
not religious, criteria to further educational, not religious, aims.' Even if
those cultural differences were so inextricably linked to religion that the
legislature could have been motivated by religion to enact Chapter 748, Justice
Scalia insisted the Act was constitutional as an accommodation.
Justice Scalia disagreed with Justice Souter's majority's decision because
he believed safeguards did exist that would ensure impartial decision-making.
For instance, a similarly situated group could sue the legislature if it suspected
unfair treatment. 29 Justice Scalia reasoned that no legislative decision
should be declared unconstitutional simply because "it does not announce in
advance how all future cases ... will be disposed of.' 30
126. Id. Justice Kennedy found it essential that "New York did not impose or
increase any burden on non-Satmars ... that might disqualify the District as a genuine
accommodation." Id No burden placed on non-Satmars, such as an increase in taxes,
outweighed the burden lifted by the Act. Id. Justice Kennedy pointed to examples of
similar cases in which religious burdens were lifted. See, e.g., Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 442 (1971) (upholding a military draft exemption based on a
religious objection necessarily increased the chances of those with no religious
objection being drafted, yet the exemption was constitutional); Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327,336-37 (1987) (upholding an exception to employee discrimination laws allowing
religious organizations to favor their own members in hiring).
127. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2505 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
128. Id. at 2511 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority thought the dissent's
solution was unworkable. "[U]nder the dissent's theory, if New York were to pass a
law providing school buses only for children attending Christian day schools, we
would be constrained to uphold the statute against Establishment Clause attack until
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Although agreeing with Justice Souter's plurality that government cannot
delegate power to religious organizations as such, Justice Scalia argued that
the plurality had misapplied the principle. 3 ' While Justice Souter stated
Grendel's Den was an "instructive comparison", Justice Scalia found it an
inappropriate precedent for deciding Kiryas Joel because the party receiving
the benefit of the legislative act in Grendel's Den was a church, while in
Kiryas Joel those that benefitted were the voting citizens of the village.'
Justice Scalia stated the distinction was not merely facial and disagreed with
the plurality that the enactment of Chapter 748 was religiously motivated.'33
Instead, Justice Scalia reasoned that Chapter 748 was enacted by the
legislature to cure a unique problem-cultural differences prevented the
Satmar children from receiving adequate special education in the public school
system, a right guaranteed to them by law.'34
Even if cultural differences, dress, language and avoidance of
assimilation, were an integral part of the Satmar's religious belief, as distinct
from a mere accompaniment of that belief, there was no proof that the
legislature sought to benefit the Satmars because of their religion. 3 Justice
Scalia contended that it made no difference whether the legislature knew, at
the time it drew the boundaries of the school district, that the village was
populated exclusively by Satmars. It was irrelevant, he reasoned because that
exclusion was not the result of the Satmars' desire to separate themselves, but
rather the result of the non-Satmars' desire not to live in a high-density zoning
area.'36 Justice Scalia believed this was simply further support of his
conclusion that cultural, not religious, differences were the source of the
conflict.
Taking the analysis yet one step further, Justice Scalia believed that even
if the Court were able to show the legislature was motivated by a desire to
benefit the Satmars religiously, Chapter 748 was still constitutional, as an
accommodation. A legislature acting "to accommodate religion, particularly
faced by a request from a non-Christian family for equal treatment under the patently
unequal law." Id. at 2494; cf Everson, 330 U.S. at 17 (holding that a statute
authorizing school districts to provide for the transportation of public, private and
parochial school students to and from school was constitutional).
131. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 207 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 33-34.
135. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2510 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Church of
Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2231 (1993) (holding that by
providing more frequent garbage collection to the city, the government intended not
to further the religious practice of animal sacrifice, but rather to maintain sanitation).
136. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2510 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a minority sect ... follows the best of our [nation's] traditions."'17 Justice
Scalia found Zorach v. Clauson'38 analogous. In that case, the Court held
that a program allowing children to be released from public schools for an
hour each week to receive religious training "accommodates the public service
to their spiritual needs" and that finding the program unconstitutional would
"show a callous indifference to religious groups."' 39 Justice Scalia pointed
out that principles of accommodation are deeply rooted and examples can even
be found in the Constitution. 40
With regard to Aguilar, Justice Scalia agreed with Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy that the decision should be reconsidered. "[T]hese cases, so hostile
to our national tradition of accommodation, should be overruled at the earliest
opportunity; but meanwhile, today's opinion causes us to lose still further
ground .... 141
He also commented on the Court's refusal to use the Lemon test, as
follows: "it seems quite inefficient for this Court, which in reaching its
decisions relies heavily on the briefing of the parties and ... the opinions of
lower courts, to mislead [them] about the relevance of the Lemon test."'42
He advocated abandoning the Lemon test, but would not "let case law 'evolve'
into a series of situation-specific rules," as he understood Justice O'Connor as
having suggested.'43 Justice O'Connor's recommendation, he thought,
would leave the Court with no guidelines and would instead "announce that
we are now so bold that we no longer feel the need even to pretend that our
haphazard course of Establishment Clause decisions is governed by any
principle.'""
E. Back to Court
The Court's decision in Kiryas Joel never resulted in the village's public
school closing. Less than two weeks after the decision was rendered, the New
York Legislature passed, and the Governor signed, an act allowing any
137. Id.
138. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
139. Id. at 314.
140. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (For instance, Article
VI was amended to say officers of the three branches of government would bind
themselves to support the Constitution "by oath or affirmation" because certain
religious tenants disallow members to take oaths) (emphasis added). See also Hobbie,
480 U.S. at 144-145; Amos, 483 U.S. at 338; Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
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municipality that meets certain criteria to establish its own school district.4 '
This act, of broader application than Chapter 748, was intended to comply
with Justice O'Connor's suggestion that an act generally applicable to any
group meeting specific qualifications would be more likely to pass
constitutional muster.1
46
The new act was once again challenged by Kiryas Joel's original
plaintiffs. They alleged the new law was only facially broad and that its
specific criteria of size, wealth and location could only be met by the Village
of Kiryas Joel. The legislature, on the other hand, estimated that at least
twenty villages qualified for the new law.
47
On March 8, 1995, the same New York trial judge that declared Chapter
748 unconstitutional in 1992 upheld the new law. 148  Although he
acknowledged it was enacted with the Satmar's "conundrum" in mind, he
concluded that the law was religiously neutral because it was written in such
a way that it would also be applicable to those similarly situated. 149 Thus,
the new law accommodated the Satmars "without singling them out for
favorable treatment." 15
0
In reaching this result, the trial judge used Lemon's three-pronged test,
even though the test was disregarded by the Supreme Court in Kiryas Joel.
Because the Court had not agreed on a replacement or reformulation of the
Establishment Clause test, the trial judge applied of Lemon necessary. He
expressed his adherence to the test: "Absent an announced abandonment of
Lemon by the Supreme Court, it remains the law and shall be applied."'
5 1
Justice Scalia foreshadowed the trial court's use of Lemon, stating in
Kiryas Joel that it was "inefficient" for the Court not to explicitly overrule the
Lemon test, considering that litigants and lower courts, who prepare their
Establishment Clause arguments and decisions using Supreme Court precedent,
are bound by Lemon.
5 2
145. 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 241. See also Cuomo signs a Bill to Keep Hasidic
school open, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1994, at B 1, p. 24, col. 4.
146. 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 241.
147. Id.
148. Grumet v. Cuomo, 625 N.Y.S.2d. 1000 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). See also
Court Affirms Public School for Hasidim, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 1995, at § B; p. 1;
col. 5.
149. Grumet, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1004.
152. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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V. COMMENT
Six Supreme Court Justices analyzed Kiryas Joel in four separate
opinions to conclude Chapter 748 was unconstitutional, and even then three
Justices dissented. The need to redefine or reformulate Establishment Clause
standards is obvious. Lemon, the traditional Establishment Clause test, was
reduced to "see also" citations in Justice Souter's majority and plurality
opinions, and the only Justice that affirmed his commitment to the test has
retired.' Despite the need for reformulation of Establishment Clause
principles, no new tests were introduced in Kiryas Joel, nor did one of the
existing alternatives emerge as the most appropriate for analyzing the issue
specific to that case-concerning statutes alleged to single out certain religious
groups for special treatment.
Concurring in Kiryas Joel, Justice O'Connor suggested the reason the
Justices cannot reach an agreement on a particular standard is that Establish-
ment Clause issues do not fit a single mold.'54 In fact, Establishment Clause
jurisprudence covers various dissimilar issues."' The Court's past attempts
to use a unitary standard have stretched Lemon beyond its original bounds,
and, when that does not work, it has invoked exceptions to the rule on a case-
by-case basis.'56 "Rather than taking the opportunity to derive narrower,
more precise tests from the case law, courts ... try to patch up the broad test,
making it more and more amorphous and distorted."'
5 7
153. Id. at 2494-95 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 2498-2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155. Id. Justice O'Connor identified the following categories of Establishment
Clause litigation: (1) those involving "governmental actions targeted at particular
individuals or groups, imposing special duties or giving special benefits;" (2) those
"involving governmental speech on religious topics;" (3) those that "require an analysis
focusing on whether the speech endorses or disapproves of religion, rather than on
whether the government action is neutral with regard to religion;" (4) those "in which
the government must make decisions about matters of religious doctrine and religious
law;" and (5) "government delegations of power to religious bodies." Justice
O'Connor intended this list be illustrative, not conclusive. Id.
156. Id. at 2499 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For example, she believed the
decisions in Amos, 483 U.S. at 336-37, Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 125-26, Aguilar,
473 U.S. at 413 and Lee, 112 S.Ct. at 2658 resulted from "shoehorning new problems
into a test that does not reflect the special concerns raised by those problems ......
Id.
157. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2499 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In the 1995
term, the Court considered Establishment Clause issues in two cases: Capitol Square
Review and Advising Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995) and Rosenburger v. The
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). Neither
majority opinion cited to Lemon. In Pinetfe, the petitioner argued that Ohio had to
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In the same way, the dispute giving rise to Kiryas Joel and the various
opinions in Kiryas Joel made obvious the lack of a mutually satisfactory
Establishment Clause test and the need for such clarification. The decision in
Aguilar, which prompted this dispute by compelling the Monroe-Woodbury
School District to abandon its original arrangement, was likely erroneous
according to five Justices on the Kiryas Joel Court.58 In Aguilar, the Court
relied on Lemon, and it arrived at a decision "hostile" to religion.'59 "It is
the court's insistence on disfavoring religion in Aguilar that led new York to
favor it [by enacting Chapter 748]," stated Justice O'Connor.6
Instead of using a unitary standard, such as Lemon, the Court should
implement clear, concise tests geared not at the Establishment Clause,
generally, but at the Establishment Clause's more specific issues. A standard
specifically crafted for the issue considered in Kiryas Joel already exists.
Instructing courts to disfavor legislative attempts to single out certain religious
groups for special treatment, the strict scrutiny approach is tailored to the
Kiryas Joel dilemma. Approaching Establishment Clause issues on a more
individualized basis than Lemon provides would serve at least three important
refuse the Ku Klux Klan's request for a permit to erect a Latin cross in the plaza next
to the state capitol in order to avoid official endorsement of Christianity. Pinette, 115
S. Ct. at 2446. Seven justices rejected this claim. Justice Scalia, author of the dissent
in Kiryas Joel, wrote the plurality opinion in Pinette. He refused to use the petitioners
"transferred endorsement" test and relied primarily on Lamb's Chapel and Widmar.
Id. at 2449. Justice Scalia concluded that where expression is purely private and
occurs in a public forum open to all on equal terms, government bodies allowing such
expression do not endorse it. Id. at 2450.
In Rosenburger, the court voted 5 to 4 that a university would not violate
neutrality or endorsement principles by providing funds for a Christian magazine on
an equal basis with other student publications. Rosenburger, 115 S. Ct. at 2524.
Although the majority does not mention Lemon, it uses two-thirds of the Lemon test
in Rosenburger, excluding analysis only of the "entanglement" prong. Id Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion stated the "purpose" prong was satisfied: "There is no
suggestion that the university created [the program] ... with the purpose of aiding a
religious cause." Id, at 2521. As to the "effect" prong, Justice Kennedy reasoned that
the Establishment Clause was not violated since the university subsidizes the cost for
printing for a range of student publications and "[a]ny benefit to religion is incidental
.... "Id. at 2524.
158. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, each writing separately, and Justice Scalia,
with whom Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined, expressed thatAguilar
should be reconsidered. Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia also indicated they believe
the result in Aguilar's companion case, School Dist of Grand Rapids was also
erroneous. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring) and 2515 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) and 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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functions: it would reduce confusion regarding the standards' applicability,
provide guidelines for litigants and lower courts, and minimize the chances
that Supreme Court Justices will second-guess past decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
By virtually ignoring Lemon in its analysis of Kiryas Joel, the Supreme
Court simply followed a trend it had set in motion in earlier cases. This
specific holding may serve to further weaken Lemon's grasp on Establishment
Clause issues, especially when the analysis involves governmental delegations
of power on religious grounds. At the same time, the Court, because it could
not agree on a replacement for Lemon, did not leave lower courts free to
follow the Supreme Court's direction. Lower courts are not authorized to
supplant Lemon with more appropriate, case-specific Establishment Clause
tests until Lemon is overruled explicitly. 6' Thus, Lemon will remain the
standard until the proper Establishment Clause test(s) are made clear by a
majority of the Court. Soon, the Court needs to reaffirm its commitment to
Lemon," overrule the test, implement another unitary test, or replace the
single-test method with several more narrowly drawn standards to fit specific
issues.
The most obvious approach is to dispel the notion that all Establishment
Clause issues can be bound by one three-pronged checklist. Rather, each
diverse area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence requires its own
particularized guidelines. In cases involving alleged delegation of civil
authority based on religious criteria, strict scrutiny has been presented as an
appropriate standard. 63 Although the Court did not offer guidance for the
lower courts regarding the appropriate Establishment Clause test or tests, six
members of the court ultimately reached the result required by a strict scrutiny
analysis. They weighed the principles of separationism with those of
accommodation and found that legislation delegating power based, on religious
criteria should be upheld only when the legislature wrote the act with religious
neutrality, to accommodate, not to establish, religion.
STEPHANIE E. RUSSELL
161. See, e.g., Grumet v. Cuomo, 625 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
162. This is unlikely. "As the Court's opinion today shows, the slide away from
[Lemon] . . . is well under way. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. 2500 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
163. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
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